Feres and the Privacy Act: Are Military Personnel Records Protected? by Juergens, Eric
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 85 
Number 1 Volume 85, Winter 2011, Number 1 Article 8 
October 2011 
Feres and the Privacy Act: Are Military Personnel Records 
Protected? 
Eric Juergens 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Juergens, Eric (2011) "Feres and the Privacy Act: Are Military Personnel Records Protected?," St. John's 
Law Review: Vol. 85 : No. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol85/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011 4:15 PM 
 
313 
FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT:   
ARE MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS 
PROTECTED? 
ERIC JUERGENS†
INTRODUCTION 
 
A book author is permitted to observe the training of a group 
of Navy aviators as they learn the intricacies of flying a high-
powered fighter jet.1  During this training, one of the pilots, Mary 
Louise commits serious errors, including aligning her aircraft 
with the wrong runway and causing another pilot to take evasive 
action while flying in formation.2  The Navy launches an 
investigation into whether Mary Louise should continue to fly, 
producing hearings and documentary evidence, and ultimately, 
Mary Louise is allowed to keep her position.3  The book this 
author later releases quotes from the negative reports on Mary 
Louise that the Navy had permitted him to see.4  Mary Louise 
sues the Navy for violations of the Privacy Act for releasing her 
private information without her consent.5  This may seem like a 
fairly obvious and egregious violation of the Privacy Act, but the 
inquiry is not nearly that simple.  Indeed, she may not even be 
able to bring the suit because she is a member of the United 
States Armed Forces.6
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S., University of Delaware, 2008. A special thanks to 
Vice Dean Emeritus Andrew J. Simons for his guidance and encouragement in 
writing this Note. I dedicate this Note to my late grandfather, a United States Coast 
Guard veteran, who never stopped learning. 
 
1 See Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2002). This 
case is discussed in more detail below. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
2 See Brief for Appellee at 2, Cummings, 279 F.3d 1051 (Nos. 00-5348, 98-1183). 
3 See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1052–53. 
4 See id. at 1053. 
5 See id. The Privacy Act, as discussed infra Part I.B, essentially states that an 
agency cannot disclose any record without the written consent of the individual to 
whom the record pertains. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 2011). 
6 Her claim may be barred because of the Feres doctrine, which is discussed in 
great detail below. The Feres doctrine bars claims by members of the military 
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The Privacy Act protects individuals from the release of 
confidential records by the United States government without 
that person’s consent.7  Not everyone, however, is so protected.  
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Uhl v. Swanstrom 
barred Privacy Act claims by members of the military,8 while the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Cummings v. 
Department of the Navy allowed such a claim.9
The United States Armed Forces rely on an all-volunteer 
force to accomplish the military missions of this nation and 
protect its citizens from harm at home and abroad.
  This Note 
suggests that, upon close scrutiny, these two seemingly 
irreconcilable decisions are actually in accord with each other 
and in harmony with the congressional intent of the Privacy Act. 
10  The 
military has long been subject to a system of justice different 
from that which the general citizens are subject.11  This alternate 
system of justice governed soldiers during World War I and 
World War II, even though many of them were drafted into 
service.12  In response to the astonishing number of courts-
martial during World War II, Congress passed the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).13  This legislation, implemented 
through executive orders, formed the Manual for Courts-Martial 
(“MCM”) and was a major revision of the law governing the 
military.14
 
against the United States government for various torts and other causes of action. 
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); infra Part I.A. 
  The preamble to the MCM states its objectives:  “The 
purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in 
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces,  
to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military 
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of 
7 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b). 
8 See 79 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 1996). 
9 See 279 F.3d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
10 See Military Justice Fact Sheets: The Military Justice System, U.S. MARINE 
CORPS, http://www.marines.mil/unit/judgeadvocate/Documents/JAM/Mil_Justice_ 
Materials/Resources/MJFACTSHTS.htm#Military%20Justice (last visited Mar. 26, 
2011) [hereinafter U.S. MARINE CORPS]. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. There were approximately two million courts-martial during World War II. 
Id. 
13 Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006 & Supp. I 2010). 
14 See U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 10. 
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the United States.”15  Since the military is governed by this 
alternate justice system, the question thus arises whether 
members of the military, or the military branches themselves, 
are subject to more general civil laws such as the Federal Torts 
Claim Act (“FTCA”),16 Bivens claims,17 and the Privacy Act.18
Despite the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA, the 
Supreme Court prohibited members of the military from bringing 
claims under the FTCA.  This bar began in Feres v. United 
States,
 
19 where, as explored below, the Court held, in a ruling 
now known as the Feres doctrine, that “the Government is not 
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service.”20  After Feres, the Supreme Court 
extended the Feres doctrine beyond its original scope, and the 
rationales behind the doctrine evolved.  Claims for injuries that 
“arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service” 
are prohibited.21  Such a service-related claim must, according to 
United States v. Johnson, be barred because it “necessarily 
implicates the military judgments and decisions that are 
inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military 
mission.”22
Over the next few decades, the Feres doctrine expanded 
beyond personal injury claims and became relevant in the 
context of privacy.  In 1974, amidst concerns over an increased 
threat to personal privacy because federal agencies increasingly 
used computers to store and retrieve information, Congress 
enacted the Privacy Act.
 
23
 
15 JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 
UNITED STATES pt. I, at 1 (2008 ed.), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/ 
documents/mcm2008.pdf. 
  This Act compels notice of systems of 
records, requires the opportunity to amend inaccurate records, 
16 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006). 
17 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
18 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2011). 
19 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
20 Id. at 146. 
21 Id. 
22 481 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1987). 
23 See John F. Joyce, The Privacy Act: A Sword and a Shield But Sometimes 
Neither, 99 MIL. L. REV. 113, 118 (1983). There was also unease about the increasing 
computerization of sensitive personal data and the potential for abuse by the 
government, including possible secret systems of records. See id. 
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and protects the “individual’s interest in limiting the 
government’s acquisition and disclosure of personal 
information.”24
Currently, there appears to be a circuit split on whether the 
Feres doctrine is applicable to claims based on violations of the 
Privacy Act.  In Uhl v. Swanstrom, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that the Feres doctrine did apply to the Privacy Act, 
barring the claims asserted.
 
25  Affirming the district court’s 
determination, the court stated that it was “equally reluctant, yet 
legally bound, to hold that plaintiff’s claims in the present case 
are non-justiciable under the Feres doctrine.”26  Six years later, in 
Cummings v. Department of the Navy,27 the D.C. Circuit held 
that the Feres doctrine was not a bar to Privacy Act claims.28  
The court held that it did not have to “ ‘enlarge’ by any stretch 
the Privacy Act’s purview in order for the statute to avoid the 
effects of the Feres doctrine.”29  The court indicated that none of 
the rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court, such as the 
effect on military discipline and decisionmaking, were implicated 
in a lawsuit under the Privacy Act.30  The Eastern District of 
New York recently highlighted this issue in MacQuill v. Killian,31 
where the court documented the apparent split in circuits and 
sided with the D.C. Circuit, allowing Privacy Act claims 
notwithstanding the Feres doctrine.32
This Note contends that Uhl and Cummings are actually in 
harmony, and therefore, the Feres doctrine should apply to bar 
some claims under the Privacy Act, but not others.  Claims by 
military personnel under the Privacy Act should be barred when 
the records are released solely within the military structure 
because the release is truly “incident to service” and invokes the 
rationales of the Feres doctrine.  In cases where the military 
 
 
24 Id. at 126–27. 
25 79 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 1996). Uhl claimed violations of due process and 
equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the Privacy Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 552a, and a pendent state law claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
Id. at 752. 
26 Id. at 755 (adopting the rationale of the district court). 
27 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
28 See id. at 1058. 
29 Id. at 1055. 
30 See id. at 1055–56. For an extensive description of the rationales underlying 
the doctrine see discussion infra Part I.A, II.B. 
31 No. 07-CV-1566 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008). 
32 See id. at 10–12. 
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releases a serviceperson’s records to persons outside the military, 
however, the rationales of Feres are not applicable and should 
not bar recovery.  Part I explores the background of the Feres 
doctrine and its progeny and discusses the Privacy Act in 
general.  Part II highlights the two circuit court decisions, Uhl v. 
Swanstrom33 and Cummings v. Department of the Navy34
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FERES DOCTRINE AND 
THE PRIVACY ACT 
 and 
their apparent conflict.  This Part also analyzes the rationales 
that underlie the doctrine and the normative arguments for and 
against the continued use of the doctrine and its expansion to 
Privacy Act claims.  Part III proposes that the Supreme Court 
consider a new test.  First, the Court should look at whether the 
release of records occurs incident to service and should focus on 
the recipient of the released information.  If the information 
protected by the Privacy Act was released within the military 
command structure, and thus subject to the rules and regulations 
of the military, the claims should be barred.  But, if the release is 
made to an outside civilian party, then the claims should be 
allowed.  This approach would protect military discipline and 
decisionmaking while still giving plaintiffs a remedy in 
appropriate cases. 
The Feres doctine is a major aspect of the law governing the 
military, barring many tort claims.35  The Feres doctrine has just 
begun to intersect with the Privacy Act, an act that seeks to 
protect individual’s records.36
 
33 79 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 1996). 
  Part A discusses sovereign 
immunity and the wide-scale waiver by Congress in the FTCA in 
general.  It then examines the evolution of the Feres doctrine 
from a principle that barred some claims by military personnel 
under the FTCA to one that withdraws nearly all judicial inquiry 
in the area.  Finally, this Part discusses the arguments that the 
Court has made in support of and against the doctrine, earning  
 
 
both the approval and condemnation of the doctrine by 
34 279 F.3d 1051. 
35 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
36 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2011). 
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commentators.  Part B offers an overview of the Privacy Act, its 
various provisions, and its civil and criminal remedies.   
A. The Development of the Feres Doctrine 
The United States’ doctrine of sovereign immunity has its 
roots in English law, which prohibited suit against the King 
without his consent.37  In Chisholm v. Georgia,38 the Supreme 
Court allowed for suits against states, rejecting the English 
notion of sovereign immunity.39  The Eleventh Amendment was 
adopted in response to Chisholm and effectively overturned the 
decision.40
The Eleventh Amendment, however, is silent on whether the 
United States is immune from suit.  The Supreme Court, in 
Cohens v. Virginia,
   
41 interpreted the Eleventh Amendment and 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to also bar suits against the 
United States.42
 
37 See Christopher G. Froelich, Comment, Closing the Equitable Loophole: 
Assessing the Supreme Court’s Next Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable 
Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 699, 701–02 (2005); see also 
Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2007). See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and 
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963) (discussing the concept of 
sovereign immunity and its development from English law). 
  As a result of this immunity, Congress required 
individuals to petition Congress for a private bill that would 
38 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
39 Id. at 472, 479 (upholding federal jurisdiction of a suit by an individual 
against a state); Brou, supra note 37. 
40 See Brou, supra note 37. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment was extended 
in Hans v. Louisiana to confer sovereign immunity on the states from suit by a 
citizen of the state in federal court even when the claim is based on federal law or 
the Constitution. See 134 U.S. 1, 15, 20–21 (1890). The current interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment by the Supreme Court would require it to read: 
No state may be sued in federal court by any person or foreign government 
unless the state consents to the suit or Congress has clearly and 
unequivocally abrogated this immunity by exercise of its powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For purposes of this amendment a 
state official is not a state unless the remedy sought against a state official 
would require the state to pay compensation for past actions. 
CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 122 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
41 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
42 See Brou, supra note 37; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. at 411–12. 
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provide redress from the federal government.43  This process 
eventually proved to be inadequate because of the volume of 
claims received.44  Finally, Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946 
and effectively waived sovereign immunity for a wide variety of 
tort claims.45  In short, the current version of the FTCA provides 
that “[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions 
of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual in like circumstances, but 
shall not be liable for . . . punitive damages.”46
The relationship between the military and the United States 
government’s liability under the FTCA was first examined in 
Brooks v. United States.
 
47  In that case, Brooks had been riding in 
an automobile, which was struck by an Army truck driven by a 
civilian employee.48  Brooks and his father were seriously 
injured, and his brother was killed.49  The government contended 
that recovery should be barred because Brooks and his brother 
were in the armed services at the time of the accident.50  In this 
case of first impression, the Court rejected the government’s 
interpretation of the FTCA and held that the brothers could 
recover because they had been off-duty, on leave, and in a civilian 
automobile at the time the accident occurred.51  The Court, 
however, noted that “[w]ere the accident incident to the Brooks’ 
service, a wholly different case would be presented.”52
The Court considered such a “wholly different case” less  
than a year later.  That case, Feres v. United States, established 
the exclusion of claims by members of the military.
   
53  Feres 
consolidated three cases brought under the FTCA.54
 
43 See R. Matthew Molash, Note, If You Can’t Save Us, Save Our Families: The 
Feres Doctrine and Servicemen’s Kin, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 317, 319–20. 
  In one case, 
44 See id. at 320 (discussing the Court of Claims and the development of the 
private bill process). 
45 See Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 534–35 (1947). 
46 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
47 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 50–52. The Court had never before confronted a case under the FTCA 
by a member of the armed forces. See Jon F. Arnold, Note, Kitowski v United States: 
Another Military Injury Is Written off as “Incident to Service,” 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 469, 
470 (1992). 
52 Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52. 
53 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
54 Id. at 136. 
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the decedent perished in a barracks fire while on duty, and his 
executrix alleged that the military was negligent for housing him 
in barracks known to be unsafe due to a defective heating system 
and for failure to keep a sufficient fire watch.55  The second case 
involved a soldier who underwent surgery and eight months later 
endured another operation where “a towel 30 inches long by 18 
inches wide, marked ‘Medical Department U.S. Army,’ was 
discovered and removed from his stomach.”56  The Plaintiff 
alleged that the army surgeon negligently left the towel in his 
abdomen.57  The third case alleged that the decedent died 
“because of negligent and unskillful medical treatment by army 
surgeons.”58
The only question presented to the Court was whether the 
FTCA extended to injuries that were incurred “incident 
to . . . service.”
  
59  The Court discussed the legislative history of 
the FTCA and the “long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of 
sovereign immunity from suit.”60  Nonetheless, the Court held, in 
a ruling now known as the Feres doctrine, that “the Government 
is not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where 
the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service.”61
The Court identified three rationales for its decision to 
exclude claims by members of the military against the U.S. 
government.  The first rationale was based on the theory of 
double recovery.
 
62
 
55 Id. at 136–37 (discussing the Feres case). 
  The Supreme Court reasoned that a 
comprehensive system of benefits already existed for members of 
the military and their families and that allowing suits would 
56 Id. at 137 (relating the facts of the Jefferson case). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (recounting the facts of the Griggs case). 
59 Id. at 138. 
60 Id. at 139. The Court acknowledged that there are not any committee reports 
or floor debates to aid in the interpretation of the statute. Id. at 138. The Court, 
however, recognized that there was a remedy if they did not properly interpret the 
statute—Congress could clarify what it meant with a new law. Id. Special 
significance was paid to the fact that “eighteen tort claims bills were introduced in 
Congress between 1925 and 1935 and all but two expressly denied recovery to 
members of the armed forces.” Id. at 139. The FTCA does define an employee of the 
government to include members of the armed forces. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006). 
61 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
62 See id. at 140; Brou, supra note 37, at 15. 
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provide a double recovery for successful plaintiffs.63  Essentially, 
these injuries were better handled by the Veterans’ 
Administration (“VA”) compensation system, which is analogous 
to a no-fault workers’ compensation system.64  This system 
provides for “simple, certain, and uniform compensation for 
injuries or death of those in armed services.”65
The second rationale the Court discussed was the lack of 
analogous liability of a private individual.
 
66  Here, the Court 
looked at the language of the FTCA which states that “[t]he 
United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”67  
This language presented a problem for plaintiffs because there 
was no corresponding liability for a private individual, and “no 
American law . . . has permitted a soldier to recover for 
negligence, against either his superior officers or the 
Government.”68  In addition, even if the term “individual” in the 
FTCA was defined to include the states, no state allowed for suits 
by members of its militia.69
The third rationale the Court cited was the desire to avoid 
forcing state law on a federal relationship.  The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he relationship between the Government and members of 
its armed forces is ‘distinctively federal in character,’ ” and thus, 
if soldiers could sue, state law would be imposed onto that 
relationship.
 
70  As a result, “sheer luck of assignment” in a 
specific geographical area would determine the recovery a soldier 
could receive, if any at all, because it would be based on state 
law.71
 
63 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 140 (“The primary purpose of the Act was to extend a 
remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well 
provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.”). 
  These resulting inconsistencies “would disrupt the 
64 Id. at 145; see also Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the 
Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2003) (discussing the “[a]vailability of [v]eterans’ [b]enefits 
and [c]ompensation”). 
65 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. 
66 Id. at 141; see Brou, supra note 37, at 16. 
67 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (second alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 
(2006)). 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 142. 
70 Id. at 143–44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 
(1947), superseded by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651–2653 (2006)). 
71 Brou, supra note 37, at 16; see also Feres, 340 U.S. at 142–43. 
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uniformity necessary to the effective operation of the armed 
forces.”72
Following Feres, the “incident to service” test became the 
most important aspect in determining whether a military 
plaintiff could recover against the government.  This test is vital 
because the Court in Feres distinguished Brooks v. United States 
on the grounds that “[t]he injury to Brooks did not arise out of or 
in the course of military duty.”
 
73  Similarly, Feres held that The 
Military Personnel Claims Act74 specifically excluded recovery 
when the injury occurred “incident to their service.”75  The 
“incident to service” test was the most effective way to delineate 
those claims that could proceed and those that were barred.  
Thus, “[t]he ‘incident to service’ test . . . provides a line that is 
relatively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive 
inquiry into military matters.”76
1. Post-Feres Expansion of the Doctrine 
 
After Feres, the Court further developed both the “incident to 
service” test and the Feres doctrine.  For example, in United 
States v. Brown, the Court allowed members of the military 
whose injuries were sustained after their departure from the 
military to recover under the FTCA.77  In Brown, the Plaintiff 
injured his leg on active duty, but did not suffer permanent nerve 
damage until after his discharge when he had surgery at a VA 
hospital.78
 
72 Brou, supra note 37, at 16; see also Turley, supra note 64, at 12–15 
(comparing the Court’s desire for uniformity with the non-uniformity it actually 
creates). 
  The Court applied Brooks and allowed the action 
73 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. Brooks was the first case decided under the FTCA with 
military plaintiffs and allowed recovery. See Arnold, supra note 51. Therefore, to bar 
recovery in Feres, the Court needed either to distinguish or overrule Brooks, and it 
chose to distinguish the injuries in Brooks as not “incident to service.” See Feres, 340 
U.S. at 146. 
74 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1952), repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53(b), 
70A Stat. 641. 
75 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 223b). 
76 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987). 
77 348 U.S. 110, 112–13 (1954) (applying the Feres rationales: (1) no analogous 
liability for private individuals, (2) veteran’s benefits were not made an exclusive 
remedy by Congress, and (3) the fact that there would be no impact on military 
discipline because Brown was no longer on active duty or subject to military 
discipline). 
78 See id. at 110–11. 
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because the injury was sustained after his discharge, and 
therefore was not incident to service.79
Additionally, the Court expanded the Feres doctrine to bar 
third-party indemnification claims.  In Stencel Aero Engineering 
Corp. v. United States, a National Guard member’s ejection seat 
malfunctioned during an in-air emergency, and he was 
permanently injured.
 
80  The Plaintiff received a lifetime disability 
pension, but sued the United States government and Stencel, 
claiming that their negligence caused the seat malfunction.81  
Stencel, who had manufactured the seat in accordance with the 
parameters required by the United States, cross-claimed against 
the United States, seeking indemnity if it were ordered to pay 
the Plaintiff.82  The Supreme Court applied Feres and held “that 
the third-party indemnity action in this case is unavailable for 
essentially the same reasons that the direct action by [Plaintiff] 
is barred by Feres.”83  These reasons include: (1) the “distinctively 
federal” nature of the relationship between the United States and 
its suppliers, (2) a comprehensive compensation system that 
limits the tort liability exposure of the United States, and (3) the 
effect on military discipline even though a third party is bringing 
the claim.84
The Supreme Court next considered whether the Feres 
doctrine barred claims for violations of constitutional rights in 
Chappell v. Wallace,
 
85 which involved a Bivens action86
 
79 See id. at 113. 
 seeking 
non-statutory damages.  Five enlisted men in the United States 
Navy claimed “that because of their minority race [their officers] 
failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave 
them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of 
80 431 U.S. 666, 667–68 (1977). 
81 See id. at 668 (alleging that both parties were liable individually and jointly 
even though plaintiff was receiving $1,500 a month in a lifetime pension award 
pursuant to the Veterans’ Benefit Act). 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 673. 
84 See id. at 672–73. 
85 462 U.S. 296, 297 (1983). 
86 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 396–97 (1971) (allowing for a suit for damages to be brought against federal 
officials whose actions violated a person’s constitutional rights, even though 
Congress had not authorized such a suit). The Court cautioned that a remedy would 
not be available if there were “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress.” Id. at 396. 
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unusual severity.”87  These actions allegedly resulted in a 
deprivation of their constitutional rights.88  The Court barred 
their claim because “the unique disciplinary structure of the 
military establishment and Congress’ activity in the field 
constitute ‘special factors’ which dictate that it would be 
inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-
type remedy against their superior officers.”89
In the cases following Feres, the Court gradually repudiated 
many of the rationales for barring claims under the FTCA that it 
had originally identified.  Instead, the Court began to focus on a 
single rationale: a desire to avoid a judicial intrusion into 
military matters by calling into question military discipline and 
decisionmaking.
   
90  The Court made this shift explicit in United 
States v. Shearer,91 where the government was sued for negligent 
hiring after a soldier, who had previously been convicted of 
manslaughter in Germany, murdered another soldier.92
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, 
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and  
 
 
the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort 
  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that while Feres was based on a 
variety of rationales, it was best explained by the 
 
87 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. at 304. This decision was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Stanley, when the Court ruled that a Bivens-type monetary damage remedy 
was unavailable to military plaintiffs because of the special factors that Chappell 
discussed. 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987). The Court applied the “incident to service” to 
bar the Bivens remedy. Id. at 684. Here, a further factor was “not the fact that 
Congress has chosen to afford some manner of relief in the particular case, but the 
fact that congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is 
inappropriate.” Id. at 683. The Court in Stanley also clarified the types of relief that 
would be available, saying that their statement that the court had “ ‘never held, nor 
do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts 
for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service’ ” had been 
misinterpreted. Id. (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). Instead, the Court explained 
that it was referring to injunctive or equitable relief and not money damages. See id. 
90 See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); see also Brou, supra note 
37, at 18–20 (discussing the focus on military discipline in a few Supreme Court 
cases). 
91 473 U.S. 52 (1985). 
92 See id. at 53–54. 
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Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent 
acts committed in the course of military duty.93
Specifically, the Court held: 
   
To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding 
officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian 
court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary 
decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident 
or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and 
how to place restraints on a soldier’s off-base conduct.  
But . . . such “complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to 
the composition, training, . . . and control of a military force are 
essentially professional military judgments.”94
Then again, this was not the first time that the Court 
acknowledged its reluctance to make judicial inquiries into 
matters of military discipline or decisionmaking.  In using 
Chappell’s “incident to service” test, the Court said “The special 
status of the military has required, the Constitution 
contemplated, Congress has created and this Court has long 
recognized two systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for 
civilians and one for military personnel.”
 
95  Likewise, in Stencel, 
the Court acknowledged that a “trial would . . . involve second-
guessing military orders, and would often require members of the 
Armed Services to testify in court as to each other’s decisions and 
actions.”96
The Court’s unwillingness to interfere with military 
discipline and decisionmaking was prominent in the last two 
decisions regarding the application of the Feres doctrine.  In 
United States v. Johnson,
  The Court did not want to become involved with this 
potential disruption to the military and its ability to function 
effectively. 
97 Johnson’s widow filed suit under the 
FTCA alleging that FAA flight controllers acted negligently after 
her husband’s Coast Guard helicopter, under FAA radar control, 
crashed into the side of a mountain.98
 
93 Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)). 
  The Supreme Court 
94 Id. at 58 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302). 
95 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303–04. 
96 Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). 
97 481 U.S. 681 (1987). 
98 Id. at 683. Johnson, a helicopter pilot, was searching for a lost boat. Id. at 
682–83. “The FAA . . . assumed positive radar control over the helicopter” after 
inclement weather caused a drop in visibility. Id. at 683. “Shortly thereafter, the 
helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain” and killed all crew members aboard. 
Id. 
CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete)  7/14/2011  4:15 PM 
326 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:313   
applied the Feres doctrine and barred the claim because the 
death occurred “incident to service,”99 which is “the ‘type[ ] of 
claim[ ] that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary 
in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline 
and effectiveness.’ ”100  The Court stated that the military is a 
unique, distinctive culture that “must foster instinctive 
obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps” in order to 
carry out its missions.101  Discipline is essential to the military 
accomplishing its missions and involves “duty and loyalty to one’s 
service and to one’s country.”102  In fact, “[s]uits brought by 
service members against the government for service-related 
injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective 
service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline 
in the broadest sense of the word.”103
Underscoring the disagreement on the doctrine, Justice 
Scalia dissented and argued that the doctrine should not apply 
here because a civilian, and not the military, was negligent.
   
104  
He pointed out that the Court discarded its original rationales 
because they were insufficient to support the doctrine.105  
Instead, the entire Feres doctrine rested on the weak “military 
discipline” rationale.106
In its final decision on the Feres doctrine, the Court 
confirmed its commitment to abstaining from involvement in 
military discipline and decisionmaking.  Justice Scalia authored 
the majority opinion in United States v. Stanley
  
107
 
99 Id. at 692 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). The 
main issue in this case was whether the Feres doctrine would apply even though the 
negligence alleged was on the part of a civilian agency. Id. at 682. 
 and used Feres 
100 Id. at 690 (quoting Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
101 Id. at 691 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 698. 
106 See id. at 694–700 (articulating the three rationales that were originally 
relied on in Feres and the fourth, military discipline, which was later added by the 
Court and has increasingly been the rationale relied on). 
107 483 U.S. 669 (1987). In Stanley, the plaintiff “volunteered to participate in a 
program . . . to test the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment as 
defenses against chemical warfare.” Id. at 671. Instead, he was secretly 
administered LSD and years later suffered from hallucinations, which often caused 
him to beat his wife and child in the middle of the night without the ability to recall 
it. Id. Stanley sued and the Supreme Court barred his claims because of the Feres 
doctrine. Id. at 683–84, 686. 
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to bar a Bivens-type claim for damages.108  The Court focused on 
the impact of litigation on military discipline and 
decisionmaking, noting that “Congress . . . ‘ha[s] exercised [its] 
authority to establis[h] a comprehensive internal system of 
justice to regulate military life, taking into account the special 
patterns that define the military structure.’ ”109
would often be problematic, raising the prospect of compelled 
depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning 
the details of their military commands.  Even putting aside the 
risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which would becloud 
military decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at correct 
conclusions would disrupt the military regime.
  Therefore, the 
Court withdrew from these military matters because such cases  
110
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the 
Feres doctrine since its decision in Stanley.  New issues, however, 
arise when the military releases its personnel’s information.  
 
B. The Privacy Act 
The courts originally recognized the individual right to 
privacy as a common law tort.  This individual right first received 
some attention in Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead 
v. United States,111 when he said, “The [framers] conferred, as 
against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”112  The Supreme Court initially recognized a constitutional 
right to privacy in 1965113 and has since refined it in a variety of 
areas.114  Indeed, the right to privacy has moved out of case law 
and has been codified by Congress.115
 
108 Id. at 683–84. 
  One major statute that 
governs information maintained by the federal government is the 
109 Id. at 679 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 
U.S. 296, 302 (1983)). 
110 Id. at 682–83. 
111 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
113 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965) (describing how the 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights contain “peripheral rights,” which include 
the right to privacy, and protects the interests of married persons in using 
contraceptives). 
114 See Joyce, supra note 23, at 115 n.12 (collecting cases dealing with the right 
to privacy). 
115 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2011); 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006) (“Right to 
Financial Privacy Act”). 
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Privacy Act.116  The Privacy Act is a vast piece of legislation that 
reaches nearly every agency in the federal government and seeks 
to protect the individual’s right to privacy in today’s world of easy 
access to an abundance of personal information.117  Congress 
enacted this legislation in response to fears of a mounting threat 
to personal privacy resulting from the increased use of computers 
by the federal government to maintain and retrieve 
information.118
The Privacy Act was passed in 1974 “to promote 
accountability, responsibility, legislative oversight, and open 
government with respect to the use of computer technology in the 
personal information systems and databanks of the Federal 
Government.”
 
119  Its goal is to “strike[ ] a balance between the 
individual’s right to privacy and the need for government to 
function effectively.”120
 
116 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a. Another major statute governing the federal government’s 
informational practices is the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). See id. § 552; 
Joyce, supra note 23, at 117. FOIA provides for a “judicially enforceable right of 
access to agency records except to the extent that” they fall within one of the 
enumerated exceptions to the law. Joyce, supra note 23, at 117. Much litigation 
surrounds the exceptions and their applicability in certain circumstances. See id. at 
118. The exceptions are discretionary, however, so an agency can choose to release a 
record that would otherwise be exempt if there is no “legitimate governmental 
purpose for withholding” it. Id. 
  Additionally, the Computer Matching 
and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 amended the original Privacy 
117 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b); Joyce, supra note 23. 
118 See Joyce, supra note 23. Joyce’s article also discusses the extensive 
legislative history that occurred with this bill. See id. For example, a Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare report “recommended the enactment of a federal 
‘Code of Fair Information Practices’ for all automated personal data systems.” Id. at 
119. This Code had five main principles: 
[T]here should be no records whose very existence is secret, an individual 
must be able to discover what information about him is in a record and how 
it is used, an individual must be able to prevent information collected for 
one purpose from being used for another purpose without his consent, an 
individual must be able to correct or amend erroneous information, and any 
organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their 
intended use and take precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 
Id. All of those suggestions would eventually be placed into the Privacy Act in some 
form. Id. 
119 Judith Beth Prowda et al., A Lawyer’s Ramble Down the Information 
Superhighway, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 744 (1995) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 
6916 (1974)).  
120 Gregory R. Firehock, The Increased Invulnerability of Incorrect Records 
Maintained by Law Enforcement Agencies: Doe v. FBI, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1509, 
1512 (1992).  
CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:15 PM 
2011] FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT 329 
Act.121  “The purpose of th[is new] amendment was to regulate 
the use of data-matching procedures in federal agencies.”122
The Privacy Act provides in pertinent part that “[n]o agency 
shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of 
records by any means of communication to any person, or to 
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with 
the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record 
pertains.”
 
123  While this is the main crux of the Privacy Act, 
defined terms in the statute refine its meaning.  “Agency” is 
defined as “any executive department, military department, 
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or 
other establishment in the executive branch of the Government 
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any 
independent regulatory agency.”124
 
121 Prowda et al., supra note 119, at 745. 
  “Individual” is defined as “a 
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 
122 Id. Data-matching occurs when government files are compared, as “a cost-
efficient way to allocate public resources and detect waste, fraud, and abuse of 
government programs.” Id. at 745–46. The Matching Act establishes a procedure for 
giving notice, and requiring reporting by the government. Id. at 746. 
123 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 2011). The Privacy Act also provides individuals 
with access to their records and the opportunity to correct it if it is wrong. It 
provides: 
Each agency that maintains a system of records shall (1) upon request by 
any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining 
to him which is contained in the system, permit him . . . to review the 
record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form 
comprehensible to him . . . [and] (2) permit the individual to request 
amendment of a record pertaining to him . . . . 
Id. § 552a(d)(1)–(2). 
124 Id. § 552(f)(1) (emphasis added). Section 552a(a)(1) says “the term ‘agency’ 
means agency as defined in section 552(e) of this title.” Id. § 552a(a)(1). This is an 
incorrect cite that should refer to 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1), which provides the definition 
that is cited in the above text. However, even this section refers the reader to a third 
section, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). See id. § 552(f)(1). That section states: 
“agency” means each authority of the Government of the United States, 
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does 
not include—(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the 
governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the 
government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements of 
section 552 of this title—(E) agencies composed of representatives of the 
parties or of representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes 
determined by them; (F) courts martial and military commissions; 
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied 
territory . . . . 
5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006). 
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permanent residence.”125  Therefore, the Privacy Act does not 
cover foreign nationals or business entities.126
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an 
individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not 
limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, 
and criminal or employment history and that contains his 
name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice 
print or a photograph.
  In addition, 
“record,” is defined as 
127
Another pertinent definition is “system of records,” defined as “a 
group of any records under the control of any agency from which 
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some 
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular 
assigned to the individual.”
   
128
Congress also fashioned two types of exceptions to the 
Privacy Act: general and specific.  General exceptions include any 
system of records that is “maintained by the Central Intelligence 
Agency” (“CIA”) and any system of records maintained by any 
agency that enforces criminal laws.
   
129  This includes records 
maintained by police, “prosecutors, courts, correctional, 
probation, pardon, or parole authorities” if the information 
contained in the record is gathered to identify criminal offenders, 
to investigate a crime, or to otherwise enforce the law.130
In addition, the Privacy Act provides for specific exemptions, 
two of which are relevant for this Note.  First, records that are 
“investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of 
determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications 
for . . . military service,” can be exempted from coverage under 
the Privacy Act.
   
131  Second, “evaluation material used to 
determine potential for promotion in the armed services” is 
exempt, but only to the extent that the name of the individual 
who provided the information would be disclosed, even though 
the government promised that it would not be disclosed.132
 
125 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a)(2). 
 
126 See Joyce, supra note 23, at 125. 
127 § 552a(a)(4). 
128 Id. § 552a(a)(5). 
129 Id. § 552a(j). 
130 Id. § 552a(j)(2). 
131 Id. § 552a(k)(5) (emphasis added). 
132 Id. § 552a(k)(7) (emphasis added). 
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Violations of the Privacy Act may result in criminal penalties 
for the responsible employee or officer.  The criminal penalties 
are triggered when  
[a]ny officer or employee of an agency, who by virtue of his 
employment or official position, has possession of, or access to, 
agency records which contain individually identifiable 
information the disclosure of which is prohibited by this [Act], 
and who knowing that disclosure of the specific material is so 
prohibited, willfully discloses the material in any manner to any 
person or agency not entitled to receive it.133
That officer or employee is guilty of a misdemeanor and can be 
fined up to $5,000.
   
134  Essentially, officers or employees of an 
agency cannot willfully release records that they know are 
protected by the Privacy Act to parties not entitled to receive 
those records.  The same penalties are also operative if an officer 
or employee “willfully maintains a system of records without 
meeting the notice requirements.”135  This sanction flows from 
the Privacy Act’s goal of preventing secret systems of records 
because the public has a right to know about the very existence of 
such a system.136  Additionally, “[a]ny person who knowingly and 
willfully requests or obtains any record concerning an individual 
from an agency under false pretenses” is subject to the same 
criminal liability.137  This is presumably to prevent someone from 
posing as an individual to receive access to that individual’s 
records.138  The criminal provisions of the Act do not give rise to a 
civil cause of action against the employee or officer and are solely 
penal in nature.  Therefore, the individual must pursue a 
common law action for invasion of privacy if a third party has 
wrongfully acquired access to their records.139
The Privacy Act also provides for civil remedies against 
federal agencies.
 
140
 
133 Id. § 552a(i)(1). 
  These claims are allowed if the agency “fails 
134 Id. 
135 Id. § 552a(i)(2). 
136 See Joyce, supra note 23, at 161. 
137 § 552a(i)(3). 
138 See Joyce, supra note 23, at 161. 
139 See id. 
140 § 552a(g). An agency is defined by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f) and would include 
entities such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. § 552(f). The remedies 
available include attorney fees and costs, injunctive relief, and damages. See id. 
§ 552a(g)(4)–(5). 
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to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule 
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse 
effect on an individual.”141  If any of these provisions are violated, 
the individual can bring a civil action against the agency in the 
district courts of the United States.142  For actions brought under 
§ 552a(g)(1)(D), an individual may recover actual damages, and 
any individual so entitled will receive a minimum of $1,000.143  In 
addition, an individual can recover attorney fees and the costs of 
the action from the United States.144  For the individual to 
recover, however, the court must determine that the “agency 
acted in a manner which was intentional or willful.”145
II. THE APPLICATION OF FERES TO THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE 
APPARENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
With the expansion of the Feres doctrine into other areas 
beyond the FTCA, the circuit courts appear to be split on whether 
this doctrine applies to claims brought by members of the armed 
services against the United States government for violations of 
the Privacy Act.  Part A describes, in detail, the two cases, Uhl v. 
Swanstrom146 and Cummings v. Department of the Navy,147
 
141 Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).  
 that 
Civil remedies are also available when any agency (A) makes a 
determination under subsection (d)(3) of this section not to amend an 
individual’s record in accordance with his request, or fails to make such 
review in conformity with that subsection; (B) refuses to comply with an 
individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this section; [or] (C) fails to 
maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, 
relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness 
in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or 
opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be made on the 
basis of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is 
adverse to the individual.  
Id. § 552a(g)(1)(A)–(C). This Note focuses on when the records are released to 
outside parties and does not deal with amendment or review of such records, so 
these sections are not pertinent for the purposes of this Note but complete the list of 
available remedies. 
142 Id. § 552a(g)(1). 
143 Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A). If the action is brought under § 552a(g)(1)(A), the court 
may order injunctive relief and “order the agency to amend the individual’s record.” 
Id. § 552a(g)(2)(A). If the action is brought under § 552a(g)(1)(B), then “the court 
may enjoin the agency from withholding records and order the production” of those 
records to the individual. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A). 
144 Id. § 552a(g)(4)(B). 
145 Id. § 552a(g)(4). 
146 79 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 1996). 
147 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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considered the issue and took differing positions on the 
application of Feres to the Privacy Act.  Part B identifies the 
normative arguments for and against the continued use of the 
Feres doctrine and its application to the Privacy Act. 
A. Should Feres Bar Privacy Act Claims by Members of the 
Military? The Circuits Disagree  
1. Uhl v. Swanstrom—The Eighth Circuit Bars Privacy Act 
Claims 
The issue in Uhl v. Swanstrom was whether members of the 
military could bring Privacy Act claims.148  Kenneth Uhl was a 
dual-status employee in the Iowa Air National Guard 
(“IANG”).149  As a dual-status employee, Uhl was a full-time civil 
engineer at the IANG base and a part-time IANG member.150  To 
continue working as a civil servant, he needed to remain eligible 
for military service.151  On June 9, 1988, a medical evaluation 
board declared Uhl mentally unfit for worldwide military 
service.152  Consequently, he was removed from his employment 
as a civil engineer with the IANG.153  Uhl then contested his 
discharge through the procedures provided by the military.154  
Uhl filed a complaint with the Department of Defense Office of 
the Inspector General (the “Inspector”), which investigated.155  
The Inspector concluded that the “process leading to Plaintiff’s 
discharge [was] flawed and the decision to discharge plaintiff 
[was] inappropriate and invalid.”156  The Inspector “recommended 
that [Uhl] be reinstated to the positions he would have occupied 
had he not had a break in [his] service.”157
 
148 Uhl, 79 F.3d at 752. 
  Uhl filed a claim with 
the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records, which 
agreed with the Inspector’s recommendations and also 
recommended that his records be “expunged of all references to 
149 Id. at 753. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Uhl v. Swanstrom, 876 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (N.D. Iowa 1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 
751 (8th Cir. 1996). 
153 Uhl, 79 F.3d at 753. 
154 Uhl, 876 F. Supp. at 1548. 
155 Uhl, 79 F.3d at 753. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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the medical disqualification.”158  Notwithstanding these findings, 
the IANG refused to reinstate Uhl.159  After the state court 
dismissed Uhl’s claim because of the Feres doctrine, Uhl filed the 
federal action.160
In the federal action, Uhl alleged that the Department of the 
Air Force failed to accurately maintain his records and inserted 
incorrect information without notifying or corroborating with 
him.
   
161  He also maintained that defendants distributed that 
incorrect information “with the express purpose of injuring Uhl’s 
reputation.”162  The district court considered all of Uhl’s claims 
and concluded that his Privacy Act claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations.163  The court said, “[h]owever, even 
if . . . the statute of limitations had not run before Uhl filed suit, 
Uhl’s Privacy Act claim also runs afoul of the Feres doctrine.”164  
The court concluded that all of the claims in Uhl’s amended 
complaint were barred by the Feres doctrine.165
The district court applied a two-step multifactor test and the 
“incident to service” test to determine if the doctrine should be 
applied.
  
166  The multifactor test looked at “(1) whether there is a 
relevant relationship between the service member’s activity and 
the military service, and (2) whether military discipline will be 
impeded if the challenged conduct is litigated in a civil action.”167
 
158 Id. 
  
The court concluded that these claims were incident to service 
159 Id. Plaintiff also filed an administrative claim under the FTCA with the 
Department of the Air Force, which was denied. Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Uhl v. Swanstrom, 876 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 (N.D. Iowa 1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 
751. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1561. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1564–65. Uhl had urged the court to use the two-step multifactor test. 
Id. at 1565. 
167 Id. at 1564. Three factors are used to determine if there is a relevant 
relationship, including “the duty status of the service member, the location of the 
injury, and the nature of the activity.” Id. at 1564–65. The district court discussed at 
length the Eighth Circuit decision in Watson v. Arkansas National Guard, 886 F.2d 
1004, 1010–11 (8th Cir. 1989), which provided exceptions to the application of the 
Feres doctrine. These exceptions include judicial review of the constitutionality of a 
statute and claims for limited judicial review of final agency action. See Wood v. 
United States, 968 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1992); Watson, 886 F.2d at 1010–11. Here, 
the court decided that neither of these exceptions applied to make these claims 
justiciable. See Uhl, 876 F. Supp. at 1567. 
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and satisfied the multifactor test.168  Therefore, the claims were 
nonjusticiable under the Feres doctrine because they involved  
the “review of a discrete intraservice [sic] personnel decision 
involving an assessment of an individual’s military qualifications 
for world-wide service.”169  Thus, as the court noted in the first 
sentence of its decision, “[t]his case is a stark and troublesome 
reminder that the law does not always provide a remedy for 
every wrong.”170  The Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal, 
approving “the district court’s interpretation of the law regarding 
the Feres doctrine and its application to the facts of the present 
case.”171
2. Cummings v. Department of the Navy—The D.C. Circuit 
Allows Privacy Act Claims 
 
The court in Cummings v. Department of the Navy also 
considered whether the Feres doctrine bars Privacy Act claims, 
and this case stands in stark contrast to Uhl.172  Mary Louise 
Cummings, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, was 
assigned to a flight squadron in Florida to begin training on the 
Strike Fighter Attack 18 (the “F/A-18”).173  After about seven 
months of training, the Navy assembled a Field Naval Aviator 
Evaluation Board (“FNAEB”) “to assess her flying skills and 
potential.”174  The FNAEB recommended that the Navy 
terminate Cummings’ flying status due to a failure to meet flight 
safety standards after four serious errors.175
 
168 Uhl, 876 F. Supp. at 1568. 
  Notwithstanding 
169 Id. at 1570. 
170 Id. at 1547. 
171 Uhl v. Swanstrom, 79 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 1996). 
172 279 F.3d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
173 Id. at 1052. Cummings was one of the nation’s first female Naval aviators. 
See M.I.T. Humans and Automation Lab, MASS. INST. OF TECH., 
http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/people.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
The F/A-18 is more commonly known as the Hornet. See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 
1052. 
174 Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1052–53. 
175 Id. at 1053. The errors included (1) aligning her aircraft with the wrong 
runway, (2) “violat[ing] Navy procedures governing deployment of landing gear 
while flying,” (3) an inability to correctly position her aircraft “during . . . simulated 
air-to-air combat mission, which resulted in poor tactical performance,” and 
(4) creating a dangerous flight pattern while flying in formation, causing another 
pilot to take evasive action. Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 5. This decision was 
made after examining the records from her four training flights and hearing 
testimony from her commanding officers and flight instructors. Cummings, 279 F.3d 
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this conclusion, Cummings retained her flight status and 
continued to train under the same command.176  While 
Cummings was training, the Navy let an author “follow specific 
squadron personnel without their knowledge as they proceeded 
throughout the [Hornet] training program” as research for a book 
about fighter pilot training.177  The book starred a character that 
Cummings alleged was based on her because it included “specific 
details and direct quotes from her negative [FNAEB] report.”178  
Consequently, “her military and civilian career prospects ha[d] 
been severely damaged” and “she . . . suffered severe mental 
distress, embarrassment, and humiliation, both personally and 
professionally.”179  Cummings sued for violations of the Privacy 
Act, and the district court dismissed her case because it found 
the Feres doctrine barred her claims.180  Specifically, the court 
feared that the possibility that “ ‘every time a serviceman were 
demoted or saddled with less than a perfect performance rating 
he could resort to the courthouse’ could be a very real one if 
Privacy Act suits were not subject to the Feres doctrine.”181
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit disagreed 
with the district court and ultimately concluded that Feres did 
not bar claims under the Privacy Act.
  
182  The court began with 
the Privacy Act itself and considered Congress’s language.  The 
court decided that the statute was unambiguous and, thus, that 
the plain language controlled.183
 
at 1053. It was recommended that she retain her flight status, but under a different 
administrative command. See Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
77 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
  The court determined Congress 
used explicit language that identified the Privacy Act as applying 
to military departments and provided exceptions for some 
military activities, concluding, therefore, that Congress did not 
176 Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1053. 
177 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Cummings, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 78). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cummings, 116 F. Supp. 2d 
at 78). 
180 See Cummings, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
181 Id. at 82 (quoting Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
182 See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1058. 
183 Id. at 1054. The court started with the presumption that Congress means 
what it says in the statute and said, “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, 
then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” Id. at 1053–54 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 254 (1992)). 
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intend for the courts to create additional exceptions.184  The court 
did not stop there, however.  It next addressed the argument that 
Congress was not explicit in shielding the Privacy Act from the 
Feres doctrine, even though Congress knew that the Feres 
doctrine existed.185  The court found that Congress has no reason 
to “insulate” the Privacy Act from the Feres doctrine because, at 
the time that the Privacy Act was enacted, the doctrine had not 
been expanded beyond the context of the FTCA.186  Applying 
these rationales,187 the court concluded that although the 
judiciary should not get involved in military matters under many 
circumstances, “Congress clearly enlisted the federal courts to 
inquire into potential military violations of the Privacy Act.”188  
Allowing recovery in these circumstances would not create a race 
to the courthouse by members of the military, as the district 
court feared, because the Privacy Act only provides a remedy if a 
“military department has unlawfully released the performance 
rating and if the claimant establishes that she was injured as a 
result.”189
3. The Eastern District of New York Allows Privacy Act Claims 
 
Recently, this apparent circuit split was recognized by the 
Eastern District of New York in MacQuill v. Killian, which sided 
with the D.C. Circuit in allowing military personnel claims to be 
brought under the Privacy Act.190  James R. MacQuill was a 
master sergeant in the New York Air National Guard (“NYANG”) 
and was employed as a warehouse materials handler.191  Killian 
sent a request to a local police department “seeking information 
regarding the status of MacQuill’s driver’s license” and “any 
information [regarding] . . . any other matter involving Sgt. 
MacQuill, civil or criminal.”192
 
184 Id. at 1054–55; see 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5) (West 2011) (military service 
exemption); id. § 552a(k)(7) (armed services exemption). 
  In the request, Killian also stated 
that MacQuill lied to the National Guard, disclosed an employer 
185 Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1055. 
186 Id. The court applied the maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ispa lex—
“when reason for law ceases, so does law itself”—because none of the rationales of 
the Feres doctrine were applicable there. Id. at 1055–56. 
187 See discussion supra Part I.A; see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
188 Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1056–57 (emphasis omitted). 
189 Id. at 1057. 
190 MacQuill v. Killian, No. 07-CV-1566, at 11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008). 
191 Id. at 2. MacQuill’s wife was a lieutenant colonel in the NYANG. Id. 
192 Id. at 2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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meeting, named witnesses, disclosed MacQuill’s social security 
number, and asserted that MacQuill drove illegally because he 
did not have a valid driver’s license, and therefore, jeopardized 
the safety of other National Guard members on the base.193  
Killian wrote a similar memorandum to another police 
department, but it refused his request.194  Impervious to this 
rejection, Killian filed a Freedom of Information Law request 
with the police department, which rebuffed his request, saying 
that it was an “unlawful invasion of privacy.”195  Nevertheless, 
Killian somehow obtained the records that he wanted, records 
that pertained to domestic disputes between MacQuill and his 
wife.196  Subsequently, these records were disseminated to 
various military officials, state officials adjudicating a non-
judicial punishment action, and MacQuill’s military defense 
counsel representing him in that disciplinary action—who then 
had to withdraw from representation.197  The records were also 
sent to the officials adjudicating MacQuill’s pending employment 
adverse action proceedings and to off-base civilian addresses.198  
MacQuill alleged various Privacy Act violations resulting from 
the dissemination of his records.199  On a motion to dismiss, the 
court agreed with the D.C. Circuit and held that MacQuill’s 
claims were not barred by the Feres doctrine because “Congress’s 
decision to exclude certain military documents . . . from 
protection under the Privacy Act would have been superfluous 
and redundant if the service members were barred from bringing 
suit under the Act.”200  Therefore, the court concluded, “Congress 
clearly intended to permit Privacy Act suits by service members 
against the military.”201
 
193 Id. at 3. 
 
194 See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, MacQuill, No. 07-CV-
1566, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007). 
195 MacQuill, No. 07-CV-1566, at 3. 
196 Id. 
197 See id. at 4.  
198 Id. at 3–4. 
199 See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 194, at 7. 
The court recognized the circuit split on whether the Feres doctrine barred Privacy 
Act claims. MacQuill, No. 07-CV-1566, at 12. 
200 MacQuill, No. 07-CV-1566, at 11–12. 
201 Id. at 12. 
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B. Normative Arguments for and Against the Feres Doctrine 
There are arguments both for and against expansion of the 
Feres doctrine to bar claims under the Privacy Act.  Since its 
inception, the Feres doctrine has been widely disparaged by 
commentators, including those serving in the military, as being 
unnecessary and having unintended results for those affected by 
the inability to recover.202  On the other hand, members of the 
Department of Justice and commanders of the armed services 
have applauded the doctrine and stressed its benefits for the 
country.203
There are three main arguments in favor of the continued 
application and expansion of the Feres doctrine to Privacy Act 
claims: (1) the desire to stay out of military discipline and 
decisionmaking; (2) the availability of statutorily prescribed 
remedies; and (3) the failure of Congress to take any action to 
overrule the Feres doctrine.
   
204  First, the intrusion of the 
judiciary into military decisionmaking and discipline would be a 
detriment to the effectiveness of the military in accomplishing its 
missions.205  This is a powerful argument that has captured the 
Supreme Court, which adopted it as their foremost rationale for 
preserving the doctrine.206  High-ranking officers in the armed 
services and members of the Department of Justice advanced the 
argument that the relationship between soldiers and their 
superiors is a unique and special one.207  American courts and 
Congress recognized the “unique nature” of military service and 
have been “reluctan[t] to intervene in military affairs” because of 
the potential disruption.208  For example, litigation is highly 
disruptive and inherently divisive, which goes against the 
cohesion that is necessary in the military.209
 
202 See infra notes 228–247 and accompanying text. 
  As Major General 
203 See generally The Feres Doctrine; An Examination of This Military Exception 
to the Federal Torts Claim Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=493 
[hereinafter Hearing]. 
204 See infra notes 205–227 and accompanying text. 
205 See, e.g., Brou, supra note 37, at 53–59. 
206 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1987); United States v. 
Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–91 (1987); discussion supra Part I.A. 
207 See Hearing, supra note 203. 
208 Id. (testimony of Hon. Paul Harris, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S.). 
209 Id.  
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Nolan Sklute210 indicated, “certain absolutes” are required for 
unit cohesiveness, including “strict obedience to orders; total 
loyalty to one’s organization, one’s service and our Nation; total 
loyalty up and down the chain of command; complete trust 
among and between members of one’s organization; and 
discipline.”211  If lawsuits were permitted, that cohesiveness, 
loyalty, trust, and obedience to orders would be for naught.212  
Litigation is also time-consuming and “assures this result: 
military plaintiffs and witnesses will be summoned to attend 
depositions and trials, and they will have to take time from their 
regularly assigned duties to confer with counsel and 
investigators.”213  This poses a problem because our troops are 
stationed around the world and “may have to be recalled from 
distant posts,” which is expensive and difficult.214  Such a result 
would be disruptive to our national security and defense because 
national security demands that our fighting forces are “ready to 
perform their duties at all times.”215  It would also be disruptive 
because “[c]ommanders and other military members would . . . be 
deposed and summoned into court to justify their decisions.”216  If 
litigation were allowed, it would involve the judiciary in an area 
where it has “no specialized knowledge of [the] unique challenges 
and requirements” of military service, which “would undermine 
[military leaders’] ability to train the force effectively.”217
 
210 Major General Nolan Sklute is a former United States Air Force Judge 
Advocate General, the chief military attorney for that branch. See Biographies: 
Major General Nolan Sklute, U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.af.mil/information/ 
bios/bio.asp?bioID=7160 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). He was responsible for 
providing a full range of legal services to the Air Force and supervised over 1,500 
attorneys, military and civilian. See id. 
  
Additionally, military leaders fear that such a practice would 
allow the court to second guess low level decisions and engender 
211 Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Nolan Sklute, Major General, Retired 
and Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force). 
212 See id. (testimony of Hon. Paul Harris, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S.). 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. (testimony of Nolan Sklute, Major General, Retired and Judge Advocate 
General, U.S. Air Force). 
217 Id. (testimony of John Altenberg, Major General, Retired, and Assistant 
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army). 
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the belief that no order or decision is final until a civilian court 
has ruled.218
The second argument in favor of the Feres doctrine is that 
there are statutorily prescribed remedies and procedures that 
military plaintiffs can take advantage of to recover for their 
injuries and vindicate their rights.  For example, Congress 
enacted the UCMJ, which criminalizes acts such as “[f]ailure to 
follow orders” or “conduct unbecoming an officer” to preserve 
discipline and order in the military.
   
219  In addition, military 
plaintiffs can take other “administrative, nonjudicial and judicial 
courses of action.”220  The “chain of command and the uniform 
system of accountability” are in place so that the rights of service 
members are protected without having to resort to litigation.221  
The chain of command as well as the criminal investigative 
services, inspector generals, safety officers, judge advocates, and 
the article 138 process hold military personnel accountable.222  
These processes, combined with the comprehensive benefit 
system for both soldiers and veterans, are sufficient and provide 
another reason why the Court should retain the Feres doctrine 
and expand it to cover Privacy Act claims.223
Finally, Congress has had sixty years to overrule the 
Supreme Court by clarifying the meaning of the FTCA and other 
statutes such as the Privacy Act but has failed to do so.  Since 
this is a question of statutory interpretation, “Congress can 
 
 
218 See id.; see also id. (testimony of Christopher E. Weaver, Rear Admiral and 
Commandant, U.S. Navy) (“Disruption of military operations would almost be 
inevitable, as service members might elect to weigh obedience to orders and 
compliance with directives with contemplated litigation to achieve an objective more 
to their liking or interests.”). 
219 Id. (testimony of John Altenberg, Major General, Retired, and Assistant 
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army). 
220 Id. (testimony of Christopher E. Weaver, Rear Admiral and Commandant, 
U.S. Navy). 
221 Id. 
222 See id. (testimony of John Altenberg, Major General, Retired, and Assistant 
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army); see also id. (testimony of Mr. Eugene Fidell, 
Counsel, Feldesman, Tucker, Leifer, Fidell, & Bank, LLP). In simple terms, article 
138 is a procedure for soldiers to complain about the actions of their superior 
officers. See 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006); Robert W. Ayers, Clarifying the Article 138 
Complaint Process, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2008, at 26–29 (describing the article 138 
process from when a soldier submits a complaint, through the investigation, to the 
eventual decision). 
223 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 689–90 (1987); Stencel Aero 
Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). 
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correct [an] inaccurate . . . interpretation[ ].”224  As the Supreme 
Court originally acknowledged in Feres,225 “if we misinterpret the 
[FTCA], at least Congress possesses a ready remedy.”226  The 
Court looked at this inaction again saying, “Nor has Congress 
changed this standard in the close to 40 years since it was 
articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, Congress 
‘possesses a ready remedy’ to alter a misinterpretation of its 
intent.”227
Nevertheless, many commentators and those affected by the 
doctrine denigrated the doctrine and called for it to be judicially 
overturned or legislatively repealed.
  Therefore, the Supreme Court has blatantly suggested 
that Congress should correct the interpretation if it is wrong, and 
Congress has not taken any action. 
228  Critics advanced three 
main arguments for overturning the Feres doctrine and not 
expanding it to bar claims such as those under the Privacy Act: 
(1) the doctrine is not grounded in any statute and should be 
overruled; (2) the Feres doctrine distorts the risk-reducing 
benefits of liability; and (3) civilians are able to sue for injuries 
from military actions.229  First, critics argue that the doctrine is 
not grounded in the FTCA and has distorted what Congress 
intended by enacting the FTCA and other statutes.230  For 
instance, the FTCA and Privacy Act both provide exceptions for 
when the military is engaged in combat operations or for when 
records are used for promotion purposes, and these are sufficient 
to avoid any interference with military decisionmaking.231
 
224 See Brou, supra note 37, at 74. 
  The 
effect of these exceptions on military decisionmaking and 
225 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Congress has even held hearings, taking testimony from 
a variety of military officers, lawyers, and people affected by the Feres doctrine, but 
Congress has never taken action. See Hearing, supra note 203. 
226 Feres, 340 U.S. at 138. 
227 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 138). The Court also 
noted that Congress considered but did not enact legislation that would have 
allowed members of the armed forces to file medical malpractice suits against the 
federal government. Id. at 688 n.6. 
228 See infra notes 229–247 and accompanying text. 
229 See infra notes 230–244 and accompanying text. 
230 See Turley, supra note 64. See generally Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to 
Chappell to Stanley: Three Strikes and Servicemembers Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 
93 (1990). 
231 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5), (7) (West 2011) (Privacy Act exemptions); Feres, 340 
U.S. at 146 (interpreting the FTCA to exclude injuries “incident to service”).  
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discipline is unknown, however, because the Supreme Court has 
always barred these claims.232
Additionally, critics believe there should be less concern 
about the effect on discipline because in contrast to the beliefs 
underlying many of the judicial decisions, coercive discipline—
defined as the “blind obedience to orders to avoid punishment”—
is the “least effective means of motivating soldiers to do their 
duty.”
   
233  The real motivation is “to protect their comrades and to 
get home safely.”234  Furthermore, the military “de-emphasizes 
discipline as a major component of combat leadership,” by 
requiring that soldiers disobey illegal orders and take 
initiative.235  Therefore, there is no need to preserve discipline by 
avoiding lawsuits since the specter of possible lawsuits will not 
affect discipline.236  Moreover, overturning Feres would not 
interfere with military decisionmaking because claims of 
negligence that can happen in civilian life—such as medical 
malpractice and traffic accidents—are barred claims that do not 
seem likely to have any influence on the types of decisions that  
 
 
military commanders make.237  In addition, repealing this 
doctrine should not affect military commanders’ decisions 
because they would still be free from personal liability.238
Second, critics argue that the Feres doctrine distorts the risk-
reducing benefits that liability for wrongful actions creates.
 
239  
Because the military and, by extension, the United States 
government, are not liable for the violation of a person’s rights or 
for negligent actions, the federal government has expanded into 
many collateral areas where it can compete with private 
companies at a much lower cost due to this lack of liability.240
 
232 See Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, 
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP). 
  As 
such, there is no incentive for the United States government to 
233 Tomes, supra note 230, at 108. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 109. 
236 Id. at 110. 
237 See Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, 
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP). 
238 See id. (testimony of Eugene Fidell, Counsel, Feldesman, Tucker, Leifer, 
Fidell, & Bank LLP).  
239 See Turley, supra note 64, at 46–47. 
240 See id. at 39.  
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put procedures in place to avoid risk because it does not feel the 
financial cost of its actions.241  For example, the military 
maintains long-term confinement facilities, and the court has 
extended the Feres doctrine to claims brought by members of the 
armed services held in these prisons.242  By doing so, “the courts 
have effectively cut off the most significant pressure for reform in 
correctional institutions.”243
A third argument made by critics to repeal the Feres doctrine 
is that civilians can sue for injuries resulting from military 
actions.  There is no evidence that civilian recovery, uninhibited 
by the Feres doctrine, has led to a significant increase in claims 
or affected military decisionmaking in any way.
  Therefore, critics argue, the Feres 
doctrine should be abrogated, because abrogating the doctrine 
would make the federal government more risk-adverse and would 
better protect servicepersons.   
244
Moreover, these concerns have led to constitutional 
questions of whether the Supreme Court overstepped its bounds 
in creating this doctrine.  The Feres doctrine has no basis in the 
text of the FTCA or Privacy Act “and constitutes a judicially 
imposed limitation on a right to sue granted by Congress.”
   
245  In 
addition, the Constitution itself expressly gives Congress the 
power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces.”246  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
arguably exceeded its power under the Constitution to second-
guess what Congress did in the area of military governance by 
not following the language of the statute.  Since the judiciary did 
this “at the behest of the Executive,” Congress must act to 
“restore the appropriate Constitutional balance.”247
 
241 Id. 
 
242 Id. at 35–37. Other examples given include the military’s expansion into 
transportation, recreation activities, and a medical system that goes beyond that 
necessary for combat operations. Id. at 40–46. All of these areas can be operated at a 
lower cost than a private company because the military is “not . . . forced to 
internalize the costs of accidents and negligence.” Id. at 39. 
243 Id. at 37–38. 
244 See Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, 
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP) (giving a hypothetical case). But see Turley, 
supra note 64, at 49–50. 
245 Id. (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & 
Feld, LLP). 
246 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
247 Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP). 
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III. UHL AND CUMMINGS IN PERFECT HARMONY 
As the Uhl and Cummings cases demonstrate, there are 
strong arguments on both sides as to whether the Feres doctrine 
should apply to Privacy Act claims brought by members of the 
military.  On one hand, applying the Feres doctrine would keep 
the federal courts out of military affairs since judicial inquiry in 
that area will have an adverse impact on military discipline and 
effectiveness.248  Conversely, the court could decline to apply the 
doctrine because the Feres doctrine is not applicable to claims 
under the Privacy Act since military personnel deserve a remedy, 
and no other recovery is available.249
A test could be applied to the facts of each case to determine 
if the Feres doctrine is applicable.  First, the court should apply 
the “incident to service” test to the release of information.  If the 
information is not incident to service, then the Feres doctrine is 
inapplicable and the claim should proceed.  Subsequently, if the 
release is incident to service, the court should look at the 
recipient of the information.  If it is released to another member 
of the military and kept within the military, then the rationales 
of the Feres doctrine apply to bar such claims.  If, however, the 
information is released to someone outside of the military 
command structure, then the rationales of the Feres doctrine are 
inapplicable and the claims should be allowed.  Any allowable 
claims, of course, would also be subject to the limitations of the 
Privacy Act, which require that the release be unlawful and that 
the plaintiff show an adverse effect.
  Neither of these 
approaches is ideal because they are based on a Hobson’s choice:  
Providing members of the Armed Forces with a Privacy Act 
remedy when they have been injured or putting military 
discipline and effectiveness seriously at risk.  A workable 
solution, however, might appear if the courts in those cases had 
asked one additional question:  Who was the recipient of the 
released information? 
250
Part A of this Section discusses why this test should be used 
to apply the Feres doctrine to Privacy Act claims that arise as a 
result of information being released within the military itself.  
Part B demonstrates that the doctrine need not be applied to 
 
 
248 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). 
249 Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
250 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (West 2011). 
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information that is released to outside parties who are not 
subject to the military command structure. 
A. Applying Feres to Claims Within the Military Command 
Structure 
Claims that arise within the command structure of the 
military are barred if they are incident to service because they 
invoke the rationales of the Feres doctrine and administrative 
remedies are available for military personnel to vindicate their 
rights.251  First, the “incident to service” test should be used to 
determine whether the claims are within the military command 
structure because the “ ‘incident to service’ test . . . provides a 
line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with less 
extensive inquiry into military matters.”252  This test helps the 
court decide if it should even become involved with a release of 
information because it asks if the scope of the release was 
something that arose out of or was in the course of military 
duty.253  On the other hand, if the claim is not incident to service, 
then the Feres doctrine is likewise inapplicable and the claim 
should be allowed to proceed.254
After determining that the release of information was 
incident to service,
 
255 the court should then look at the recipient 
of the information.  If the information was released to another 
member of the military, the courts are “ill-equipped to determine 
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon 
military authority might have”256 because judges have “no 
specialized knowledge of [the] unique challenges and 
requirements” of military service and should not interfere.257
 
251 See infra Part II. 
  The 
rationales of the Feres doctrine would thus apply to bar such 
claims. 
252 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987). 
253 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
254 See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). 
255 This will arguably occur very frequently since the record itself is often 
something that arises out of military service, such as a personnel record. 
256 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 181, 187 (1962)). 
257 Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of John Altenberg, Major Gen., Retired, 
and Assistant Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Army). 
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The Supreme Court has identified many rationales, but the 
one that has received the most support is the reluctance to 
interfere with military discipline and effectiveness.258  This 
rationale is directly implicated when records are released to 
other members of the military because the disruptive nature of a 
lawsuit will undermine the need for “immediate compliance with 
military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with  
no time for debate or reflection.”259  Therefore, courts should 
“hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to 
tamper with the established relationship between enlisted 
military personnel and their superior officers.”260  This is exactly 
the “type of claim[ ] that, if generally permitted, would involve 
the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of 
military discipline and effectiveness”261 because the court would 
be conducting an inquiry into whether a particular release fell  
 
under the Privacy Act or if it implicated one of the exceptions in 
the Act.262  Accordingly, a bright-line prohibition of these suits 
would prevent extremely disruptive and fractious litigation.263
In addition, the district court in Cummings acknowledged 
that the fear that “every time a serviceman were demoted or 
saddled with a less than perfect performance rating he could 
resort to the courthouse could be a very real one if Privacy Act 
suits were not subject to the Feres doctrine.”
   
264  This statement is 
a slight exaggeration because the record must be released 
unlawfully and the plaintiff must show some type of injury.265
Courts should also bar Privacy Act suits when information is 
released to other members of the military because Congress has 
 
This fear, however, is valid to the extent that it recognizes that 
many members of the military would then be able to sue if others 
found out about their performance rating. 
 
258 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 684 (1987). 
259 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300. 
260 Id. 
261 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (emphasis omitted).  
262 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)–(k) (West 2011). 
263 See Hearing, supra note 203 (statement of Hon. Paul Harris, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
264 Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
265 Id. at 1057. Section § 552a(g)(1)(D) requires an adverse effect, which may 
include financial injury. See id. at 1053. For example, in Cummings, the plaintiff 
alleged that she had suffered serious consequences to her career and that she 
suffered from humiliation, embarrassment, and severe mental distress. See id. 
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“establish[ed] a comprehensive internal system of justice to 
regulate military life, taking into account the special patterns 
that define the military structure.”266  While these remedies are 
not often used and are frequently ineffective, they do exist and 
provide another reason for the courts to bar these cases.267  These 
remedies include article 138 claims,268 which allow soldiers to 
complain about the decisions of his or her commanding  
officers.269  Article 138 provides a remedy for the plaintiff and 
resolves grievances without involving civilian courts.270  Some 
commentators have posited that asking a “commander . . . before 
sending [a] complaint through the chain of command, [is] hardly 
a confidence-inspiring procedure when the commander is the one 
who committed the [wrong].”271  While the article 138 process 
may not be the most effective way of seeking redress, it still 
provides a process for seeking redress that is sufficient to keep 
civilian courts out of military affairs because it addresses the 
exact concerns with which courts have been reluctant to 
interfere.272
 
266 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (quoting Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983)). 
 
267 See Ayers, supra note 222, at 25 (noting that article 138 claims are “not often 
sought” and as a result, “many junior Judge Advocates (JAs) are unaware of how to 
properly counsel a Soldier”). 
268 See 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006). This section codifies the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice Article 138 claims and states,  
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his 
commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding 
officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior commissioned 
officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The 
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the 
complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained 
of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true 
statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon. 
Id. Each branch of the military also has a board for the correction of records, which 
would satisfy the other parts of the Privacy Act, and allow recovery and injunctive 
relief for inaccurate records. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1552 (West 2011) (establishing a 
corrections board); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1) (West 2011) (providing civil 
remedies for violations of the Privacy Act). This part of the Privacy Act is not 
discussed in this Note, but the Feres doctrine should apply as well because there is 
already a system in place. 
269 See 10 U.S.C. § 938. 
270 See id. 
271 Tomes, supra note 230, at 115.  
272 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983). The Court relied on the 
article 138 process to dispose of the constitutional tort claims that were brought by 
the petitioners in that case. Id. at 302–04. The Court acknowledged that Congress 
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The Cummings273 court also identified as part of its rationale 
that the Privacy Act must provide for the coverage of military 
personnel because it does not explicitly exclude them.274  
Similarly, although the FTCA likewise did not expressly exclude 
claims by members of the military, the court nevertheless barred 
the claims.275  Due to the similarity between the Privacy Act and 
the FTCA—the language used, the lack of specification, and 
certain enumerated exceptions—there is no reason to think that 
the claims should also not be barred unless there is a clear 
statement by Congress.276  As noted by the dissent in Cummings, 
“Feres itself represents a refusal to read statutes with their 
ordinary sweep.  The unique setting of the military led the Feres 
Court to resist bringing the armed services within the coverage of 
a remedial statute in the absence of an express Congressional 
command.”277  Moreover, Congress has possessed a ready remedy 
for over fifty years and has never acted to restrict the use of the 
Feres doctrine.278
B. Allowing Claims if Records Are Released to Outside Parties 
 
Although the rationales of the Feres doctrine are clearly 
applicable when the records are released to other members of the 
military, they seem less relevant when the records are released 
to outside parties.  Therefore, when records are released to 
outside parties, claims should be allowed for three reasons.  
First, there is no impact on military discipline or effectiveness 
because the records released are not being used for any internal 
military purposes, whether or not they are exempt under the 
Privacy Act.279
 
has control over the military and has enacted statutes regulating military life by 
creating a judicial system that should not be interfered with by the judiciary. Id. at 
302. 
  Under the Privacy Act, if records were released to 
an outside party, the court would not be getting involved solely in 
internal military decisions and procedures, but would be looking 
273 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
274 Id. at 1054–55. 
275 Id. at 1055–56. 
276 Id. at 1058 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
277 Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 470 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
278 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
279 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)–(k) (West 2011) (exempting from coverage 
information that is used for investigation or promotion decisions). 
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at military decisions to release records to the public.  If records 
are kept within the military, even if the recipient is not entitled 
to see them, there is much less damage than if the recipient is a 
book author or newspaper who could be widely disseminate those 
records into the public arena.  The military is a specialized 
culture and community,280 which has its own procedures in place 
to ensure that those affected receive a remedy,281
Secondly, these types of suits are unlikely to be sufficiently 
related to the person’s service that they “necessarily implicate[ ] 
the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably 
intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.”
 but the secrecy 
of that community is pierced once records are released to an 
outside party, opening the door for courts to examine the 
decision.  Because the damage to a person will often be greater if 
the information is released to the outside world, a proper damage 
remedy in the federal courts is appropriate to vindicate the rights 
of that person, military or not.   
282
Finally, the other rationales that the Supreme Court has 
identified for the Feres doctrine are likewise inapplicable in this 
case.  These rationales are: (1) a lack of parallel liability for 
private individuals; (2) the “ ‘distinctively federal’ relationship 
between the United States and its military forces”; and (3) double 
recovery.
  
Therefore, the release of information by a commanding officer to 
an outside party is not likely to get the court involved in military 
decisionmaking or discipline.  This is because the plaintiff will 
not want the information to be released to that outside party and 
there will be no valid purpose for the release because the Privacy 
Act will prohibit the release.  These releases are not likely to be 
entangled with any particular military mission, and a judicial 
inquiry would therefore be appropriate. 
283  First, the rationale of no parallel liability in the 
private sector is inapposite because this statute specifically 
applies to private individuals and the Court has rejected that 
rationale.284
 
280 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–91 (1987). See generally Guy 
L. Siebold, Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology, 29 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 140 
(2001). 
   
281 See 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006). 
282 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691. 
283 See Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
284 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–42 (1950). This rationale was 
rejected in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955). 
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Second, even though there is a distinctly federal relationship 
between the United States and its military,285 that relationship is 
only implicated when the release is within the military, but not 
when it is released to outside parties.  Congress is not clear on 
whether this law would apply to the military,286 thus it is up to 
the courts to define the application of the Privacy Act to members 
of the military.  Since the Privacy Act is a federal statute, it 
would not subject members of the military to the vagaries of local 
law.  This makes the Privacy Act more applicable than the FTCA 
to military personnel under the rationales of Feres because 
recovery would not be based on luck of geographic assignment.287  
In addition, the terms of the Privacy Act are specifically defined 
to include the military branches.288
Finally, the Court was worried about a double recovery for 
members of the military under the FTCA.
  Thus, in cases of outside 
release, the rationale of avoiding results based on local law is 
also inapplicable.   
289  This is similarly 
inapplicable because there is no other provision for recovery by 
members of the military unless they obtain one under the 
provisions of the Privacy Act.  The VA compensation system will 
not provide a remedy for violations of the Privacy Act, and 
therefore military personnel will not be receiving a windfall if 
they recover in a lawsuit.290  Accordingly, recovery should be 
allowed for releases to parties outside of the command structure 
of the military because, as Justice Scalia pointed out, 
“nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be worse than . . . uniform 
nonrecovery [sic].”291
 
285 Feres, 340 U.S. at 143. 
 
286 Compare Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1055 (“[O]n its face, the Privacy Act would 
appear to permit actions brought by military personnel.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 
2000), rev’d, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002)), with id. at 1058 (Williams, J., 
dissenting) (“I see neither any greater hint from Congress that Feres should not 
govern, nor any indication that Privacy Act damage claims pose less risk of 
interference with command relations.”). 
287 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143. 
288 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f)(1) (West 2011). 
289 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. 
290 See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1056. Compare with Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
United States v. Johnson, where he posits that suits under the FTCA should be 
allowed regardless of whether the plaintiffs were previously compensated under the 
Veterans’ Benefits Act. 481 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
291 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 695–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The cases previously discussed achieved the right result 
within this rubric, but should have made one further factual 
distinction—to whom the information was released.  Applying 
this test to Cummings, Mary Louise Cummings would be allowed 
to bring her claims because the release of her information was 
not incident to her service and was to an outside party.292  The 
discipline and decisionmaking of the military is not compromised 
when the information is released to a book author, and this is the 
type of claim that the Privacy Act was intended to protect.293  
Similarly, Uhl was also correctly decided.  In that case, the 
medical records and other information were only released to 
other parts of the military that were deciding if Uhl should be 
discharged from his military and civilian positions within the 
military.294  Therefore, the court correctly barred these claims 
because of the Feres doctrine.295  Correspondingly, in MacQuill, 
the court correctly allowed the claims under this framework 
because the records were released to state officials adjudicating 
non-military matters, civilian addresses, and non-military police 
departments.296  The officials and civilians given access to these 
records were outside of the military chain of command; 
dissemination of the criminal records to these officials was 
unlawful under the Privacy Act; and thus the rationales of the 
Feres doctrine do not apply.  Accordingly, the claims were 
properly allowed to proceed because the records were sent to 
civilian addresses off-base that were home to both members of 
the NYANG and civilians outside of the military command 
structure.297
CONCLUSION 
 
The Feres doctrine has become an important part of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the realm of military affairs.298
 
292 Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1053. 
  
293 Joyce, supra note 23 (recognizing “the alarming tendency of the government 
to put information technology to uses detrimental to individual privacy”). The 
author’s name was Robert Gandt and the book he published was Bogeys and 
Bandits: Making of a Fighter Pilot. Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1053. 
294 Uhl v. Swanstrom, 79 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1996). 
295 Id. at 756. 
296 MacQuill v. Killian, No. 07-CV-1566, at 3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008). 
297 Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 194, at 6 
(E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007). 
298 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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It has been extended from its original application to the FTCA 
into a variety of areas—from Bivens claims to Americans with 
Disabilities Act claims.299  The rationales underlying the use of 
the doctrine have changed from the lack of parallel liability in 
the private sector, double compensation problems, and the 
application of state tort law to the military, to the most 
important rationale—the effect that allowing claims would have 
on military discipline and decisionmaking.300
The Privacy Act makes it unlawful for agencies to release 
records of individuals without proper consent.
   
301  It provides 
some exceptions but seems to apply at least in most instances 
across all agencies within the federal government.302  Civil 
remedies including damages and equitable relief are provided, 
and criminal sanctions can be imposed for a willful and 
intentional breach.303
The cases discussed, Cummings v. Department of the Navy 
and Uhl v. Swanstrom, seem to reflect a disagreement as to 
whether to apply the Feres doctrine to claims by members of the 
military under the Privacy Act, but are actually in harmony with 
each other due to a significant factual distinction—to whom the 
information was released.  In short, this Note proposes that the 
courts first apply the “incident to service” test, and if the release 
is incident to the plaintiff’s service, then look at the recipient of 
the released information.  If the recipient is a member of the 
military within its command structure, the claim is properly 
barred by the Feres doctrine.  But if the information is released to 
an outside, civilian party, there is no compelling reason—
military or otherwise—to bar claims.  This rationale would help 
plaintiffs obtain relief while still respecting military discipline 
and decisionmaking. 
 
 
 
299 See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1060–61 & nn.1–5 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases). 
300 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 684 & n.2 (1987). 
301 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 2011). 
302 Id. § 552a(j)–(k). 
303 Id. § 552a(g)(1) (civil penalties); id. § 552a(i)(1) (criminal penalties). 
